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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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HOW DO WE IMPROVE HEAVY FORCES TRAINING FOR COMBAT
IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Steiger
United States Army

Colonel Jack D. Rives
Project Adviser

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Abstract

AUTHOR: William A. Steiger, LTC, U.S. Army

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In years to come the United States will continue to be involved in low intensity conflicts. All elements of national power--political, economical, informational and military--will be used to solve these confrontations. If all else fails, combat operations may be required to secure national objectives. The forces that will conduct these combat operations will be tailored forces consisting of heavy, light, SOF, joint and allied forces. This paper will make suggestions that will improve unit training plans and make recommendations for the Army's training system that will improve readiness for this combat in low intensity conflict.



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INTRODUCTION

We often think of possible United States military involvement in low intensity conflict (LIC) as being a struggle between poorly armed peasants of a Third World country and U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) or other light forces in the U.S. Army. We have a mental image that an operation like Grenada is what LIC is all about. However, the scope of LIC is much broader than this and heavy forces both mechanized infantry and armor will have an increasingly important role in future operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, the potential applications of heavy forces in LIC will be explained. Next, suggestions will be made for areas that should be included in unit training plans to improve readiness for combat in low intensity conflict, hereafter called low intensity combat. And lastly, recommendations will be made on how to improve the U.S. Army's training system to better prepare heavy units for low intensity combat.

What Exactly is LIC? The current Joint Chiefs of Staff's definition is: "a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means

employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications."¹ Confrontation below conventional war still leaves a rather all-encompassing area of conflict in which heavy forces may find themselves, and I will describe later in this paper the types of operations that LIC encompasses. But first, it is important to understand the threat. Is the threat so great or diverse that would require heavy forces? Are we not moving toward a more peaceful world?

THREAT

A person does not have to be a member of the National Security Council to understand that old rivalries are breaking down and the international community is moving towards a new world order. There has been no war in Europe for 45 years and the Warsaw Pact has dissolved. Germany has united; Soviet troops are stationed on NATO soil; and longtime rivals worked together to reverse the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.

The bipolar world is being replaced by a multipolar world based on political, economic and military strengths. Conventional warfare, as we saw in the Persian Gulf War, will be substituted by regional conflicts of lesser magnitude. Despite the war in the Gulf, the world will experience more confrontations like those found in the Third World nations of Panama, Nicaragua, Liberia and the Philippines. In fact, "Of the

125 to 159 conflicts that have taken place in the past four decades, 90 percent occurred in developing regions and are best characterized as internal wars."² Additionally, 63 government changes have been the result of insurgencies.

The outlook for the future continues to indicate more of the same. There will continue to be protracted struggles in and between Third World countries, with perhaps superpower involvement, based upon competing political ideologies, nationalism, and religions. The increasing availability of armored vehicles (25 nations now possess over 1,000 armored vehicles) and other lethal, mass destruction weapons systems in the hands of some Third World nations will transform formerly minor conflicts into regional conflicts that may affect the entire world. The Cold War is over and nations are trying to understand the new international relationships of the future; some old rivalries have decreased, thus creating uncertainty and a window of opportunity for despots and would-be dictators to try to seize power.

The threat of global, total war has diminished. Trends in international relations point toward continued regional conflicts, growing political instability, and weapons proliferation in developing nations. "Because terrorism, insurgency, instability and subversion have grown with rising nationalism and religious fanaticism, the U.S. faces increasing prospects for LIC."³

U.S. POLICY

The United States has been working hard to establish world stability and to combat the probable future threats of low intensity conflict. The White House paper on National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1988, provides major policy guidance.

When it is in U.S. interest to do so, the United States will:

- Work to ameliorate the underlying causes of instability and conflict in the Third World by pursuing foreign assistance, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of democratic, social and political order.

- Support selected resistance movements opposing oppressive regimes working against U.S. interests. Such support will be coordinated with friends and allies.

- Take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by employing appropriate instruments of U.S. power. Where possible, action will be taken early--before instability leads to widespread violence; and emphasis will be placed on those measures which strengthen the threatened regime's long-term capability to deal with threats to its freedom and stability.

- Take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive forces to exploit instability.

- Assist other countries in the interdiction and eradication of illicit narcotics production and traffic.... [to] include aid to expand and improve the affected country's law enforcement capabilities, to preserve the independence and integrity of its judicial system, and to provide for the sharing of intelligence and investigative capabilities.⁴

What all this means is that the United States will combat LIC using all the elements of national power--political,

economical, informational, and military. Military power is usually the last element of national power that is used and only when all other means have been exhausted. The military option can be expressed in many different ways with combat being the last resort. The principal U.S. military instrument used is security assistance in the form of training, essential military equipment, advisory help, and logistical support. Our first line of defense then is to urge countries to take care of their own security needs. If this does not work, the United States will use military forces to assist friendly nations.

HEAVY FORCE APPLICATION IN LIC

Using military forces within the LIC environment has many options which are grouped in four broad categories. The first category is combatting terrorism, "detering acts of terrorism through active and passive measures (antiterrorism) or employing forces to directly address terrorist situations (counter-terrorism)."5 Heavy forces in all levels of conflict are involved in antiterrorism but are not normally used in counter-terrorism operations. Because of the political sensitivity of these acts and the possible requirement for a surgical strike, if military forces would be used, SOF units are the forces of choice.

The second category is peacekeeping operations. These are "efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain

a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace."⁶ It can be argued that there is a requirement here for heavy forces depending on the environment. For example, if the terrain is open (i.e., desert) where speed of reaction and protection from a highly lethal battlefield are needed, heavy forces would be favored.

The third category is insurgency, "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict," and counterinsurgency, "those military, paramilitary, political, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."⁷ U.S. support to insurgencies usually comes in the form of financial support, equipment, sometimes advisors and is usually covert; therefore, heavy forces are not envisioned being used. Heavy forces have and will in the future be involved in counterinsurgency. When asked for by a host nation and deemed by the United States to protect its vital interests, combat forces will be employed to assist in Foreign Internal Defense (FID) which is the U.S. support to the host nations' overall Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans. This assistance will be in the form of equipment, training, and advisors to assist the host nation fight its counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, U.S. combat operations may occur

for example on interdicting support from out of country sources, conducting security screens so host nation forces can regain the initiative, or securing key facilities and installations thus freeing host nation forces to resume combat operations.⁸

Once again, speed, firepower, and armor protection of heavy forces would be of great benefit in these types of operations.

The last category of LIC and the one where heavy forces will definitely play a major role is peacetime contingency operations. These operations are "possible future emergencies involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response capability, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations and equipment."⁹ Their goal is to protect U.S. assets, citizens and vital interests and for heavy forces this takes the form of strikes/raids, show of force, noncombatant evacuation, and security assistance. A recent example of U.S. contingency operations involving heavy forces was Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama where heavy forces were key ingredients to this successful operation.

TAILOR FORCES

Force planning for all military operations is based upon the factors of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available). When this analysis is done for future LIC operations it will once again reconfirm one of the strategic force imperatives of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl Vuono, which is to tailor forces for tactical/operational superiority over the enemy. The unique characteristics of heavy

forces--rapid maneuver; lethal, heavy firepower; armor protection; and psychological effect--will be vital capabilities needed more than ever by these tailored forces.

LOW INTENSITY COMBAT

While heavy forces have a potential application to at least three of the four broad LIC categories, this paper will now narrow its focus on how to prepare heavy units for low intensity combat. There has been much written about what low intensity conflict and/or combat really is, but COL (Ret) Harry Summers rightly stated that "a war, is a war, is a war." Low intensity combat is when all political, economical, and informational elements have not brought about the proper results and people start shooting. It will be a shooting war where political objectives dominate, firepower is restrained, additional severe operational constraints may be imposed, and the only real ending of the conflict will result when the original political/economic dissatisfactions are solved. So the important question to ask is: will our training plans for combat on the plains of Europe prepare heavy units for this low intensity combat? The answer is obviously no. William J. Olson, former Director for low intensity conflict in the Office of the Secretary of Defense said: "While regular forces are very well prepared to meet challenges at the mid-intensity level of conflict and above, their very preparations and the associated habits of mind do not make them equally prepared for LIC...."¹⁰ At a time when we are talking about a "forward presence" overseas and an increasing

role for the stateside "contingency forces" and "reinforcing" units, heavy units must start thinking and training for all eventualities to include low intensity combat. With the eventual drawdown of our Army in the near future, our near-term training strategy goal for active component forces is "to train the force for prompt, sustained, and successful land combat, with other services and nations where required, across the spectrum of conflict anywhere in the world."¹¹ This should also be the near-term training strategy goal for reserve component forces.

LOW INTENSITY COMBAT ENVIRONMENT

It is important at this point to describe the envisioned low intensity combat environment since it establishes the parameters from which unit training suggestions and Army recommendations are developed. Heavy forces would be used during the decisive combat phase in contingency or counterinsurgency operations after the deploy/initial combat phase and the force buildup/combat operations phase as described in the draft Strike Operations Handbook published by TRADOC in March 1990. The task force may be a division, brigade, or battalion size unit consisting of heavy, light, SOF, and joint forces. There would be a limited U.S. logistical infrastructure and host nation resource availability. The intelligence system would be rudimentary and there would be a limited in-place national communications system. The enemy's sophistication level would be similar to the PDF's (Panama Defense Forces) during Operation JUST CAUSE and the potential for escalation would be limited.

The host nation army may be untrained or poorly trained and possibly ill equipped. The population's loyalty may not be absolute for the host nation and in some cases may be a base of support for the enemy. And finally, the other elements of national power--political, economical, informational are also working and the military element is only a part of the overall national military strategy.

DOCTRINE AND TRAINING MANAGEMENT

The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine is valid for low intensity combat. The four tenets of initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization place our strength against enemy weakness and takes the fight to the enemy. Although low intensity combat is often nonlinear, the concept of deep, close, rear is still applicable. These terms may translate in LIC to, respectively, sanctuaries, close, and rear logistical bases. And finally the AirLand Battle imperatives are in fact key operating requirements that apply to all levels of conflict. The bottom line is that AirLand Battle doctrine is sound doctrine for low intensity combat.

Having an appropriate doctrine, it is now important to train to that doctrine. With most heavy units oriented to a conventional war in Europe, they must now seek a balance in their battle focus. "Battle focus guides the planning, executing, and assessment of each organization's training program to ensure its members train as they are going to fight."¹² Key

to this is conducting a thorough mission analysis and then adjusting the METL (Mission Essential Task List). New missions that have not been trained on before might include such things as raids on enemy sanctuaries, noncombatant evacuations, riot control, convoy security operations and a defend mission similar to that of U.S. firebases in Vietnam. After the new METL and battle tasks are identified it is important to crosswalk them to individual tasks, since they too may vary; and to integrate and coordinate at the battalion, brigade, and division level all combat, combat support and combat service support METL, battle tasks and individual tasks. This process will insure that the entire team has the same focus for the low intensity environment. The rest of the training management system of initial training assessment, planning, training execution, evaluation, assessment and revision of training plan to place added emphasis on weaknesses while sustaining strengths remains the same. Two additional points need to be made. First, because some missions will be new, it is important that initially all METL and battle tasks be identified and accurately assessed. This will enable early maximization of resources while developing a training plan. And secondly, since new tasks will be trained on, ample retrain time must be built into the training plan. What has just been described is not new or innovative. It is just following the prescribed training management system found in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101.

LOW INTENSITY COMBAT TRAINING SUGGESTIONS

Having a good grasp of our training system, what exactly is it that must be trained on to prepare a heavy unit for low intensity combat? In addition to requirements identified in the mission analysis and METL/battle task development process, what else needs added training attention? A thorough review of all available literature has revealed that there is no cookbook of suggested tasks. Presented next will be some training suggestions that have been found applicable in the past and might give some additional insights on how to get ready for low intensity combat. They are broken down for ease of organization by BOS (battle operational system), which "are the major functions which occur on the battlefield and must be performed by the force to successfully execute operations."¹³ The BOSS are maneuver; fire support; intelligence; mobility, counter-mobility, survivability; command and control, air defense artillery; and combat service support.

MANEUVER

Heavy forces must be able to work effectively with light and SOF forces in combined arms operations. They must understand each other's strengths and weaknesses. Differences such as logistical systems; augmentation requirements; time, distance, and OPTEMPO factors; communication requirements; and different tactical terminology must be understood by all. The draft Strike Operations Handbook is a good starting point in eliminating differences in tactics and techniques between heavy, light and

SOF and should be reviewed. Joint and combined operations take on more importance as all services will likely be represented as well as the host nation. Once again, different operating capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses must be understood and overcome through training. Operations will likely take place in cities and towns. MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) training is important for heavy forces because they will likely be employed with light forces because of their firepower, mobility, and armor protection. In addition to learning how to attack and defend in built-up areas, emphasis also needs to be placed on working with light forces in relation to augmenting their medevac and resupply capabilities and also on MOUT fire control measures. When working in cities, civilian refugee control can also become an enormous problem. Refugee safety, housing, feeding, sanitation and medical support must be planned for and leaders must be trained on how to handle these problems.

Deployment training is critical because it will speed up the in-theater employment of heavy forces. Emergency deployment readiness plans must be continuously updated and tested as well as unit training readiness to deploy by convoy, rail, plane, or boat. Units must have the right people trained as air load planners, hazardous cargo certifiers, and rail load team members. Multi-licensed drivers, especially mechanics, are critical during a deployment and unit drivers training programs must be adjusted accordingly. Finally, frequent movement planning exercises and

actual load training is needed for all these modes of transportation.

Once in country, a heavy unit must be able to move by all available means. Training is required in swim/raft operations, HET (Heavy Equipment Transport)/flatbed operations and Navy amphibious landing craft operations if available. Additionally, the ability to conduct route reconnaissance for all involved is important since bridges may be unclassified.

Low intensity combat will be characterized by controlled and sometimes restrained firepower. Every effort should be made during live fire exercises to include noncombatants in the scenarios. This will train soldiers to be more disciplined and reduce the potential of killing friendly civilians which, if it happens, has potential to negatively impact on the mission. And lastly, although not authorized in many heavy units, snipers are a great asset and psychological weapon. Every platoon should have one who is specially trained, equipped if possible, and ready for that selective mission.

FIRE SUPPORT

Whereas conventional conflict has relied on massive firepower to win, low intensity combat may require that a commander use considerable self-restraint in the use of firepower. Therefore, training needs to be conducted using Air Force smart munitions, AC-130 aircraft, and Army helicopters with

airborne and ground laser designators. This training should include ground troops using glint tape and infrared chemlights firing danger close missions, both during day and night. Restrictive fire control measures need to be incorporated into all training and tight approval procedures established for artillery, mortar, Air Force and naval gun fire missions. It should also be remembered that firepower demonstrations are also an effective psychological weapon. Additionally, when training for the employment of artillery in MOUT, a universal building numbering system should be planned for and coordinated.

Heavy units must also understand how to employ the Q36 Firefinder Radar and incorporate its information into the intelligence system and the artillery counterfire system. With the possibility of being employed on firebases where the security status outside the wire is unknown, commanders must dust off some old books on Vietnam fire base security and train on 360° artillery support as well as mutual support with other firebases. Lastly, with the distinct probability of heavy/light operations being conducted, digital/voice Tacfire interface training needs to be emphasized to ensure timely fire missions are coordinated for both units.

INTELLIGENCE

Successful low intensity combat operations depend upon timely, specific, and accurate all-source intelligence. Training plans need to incorporate a system that is proactive and

aggressive. Sources of intelligence should include the country team, local host nation police, local U.S. intelligence assets, host nation Army intelligence sources, EPW (Enemy Prisoner of War) interrogators, LRSD (Long Range Surveillance Detachment) patrols, local recon patrols and all soldiers being more aware of their surroundings. In low intensity combat HUMINT (Human Intelligence) is often the most important, reliable and timely source. The intelligence sections of a unit must be able to analyze not only the enemy order of battle but also cultural, economic, social and political problems so that a comprehensive plan can be developed to counteract dissatisfaction. All training must be conducted in a hostile radio intercept/jamming environment which is a growing capability in most low intensity environments.

Knowledge of the terrain is also a key element to success. Do not let the enemy succeed because of his familiarity with the terrain. Constantly conduct TEWT (Tactical Exercises Without Troops), terrain walks, and recons. Make on-the-spot analysis of captured maps and documents as higher headquarters analysis may not be timely. Also, training needs to be conducted on tagging captured EPWs and documents with important capture information since this is very useful during interrogations. Being in a foreign country, identification of enemy intelligence agents is extremely tough. Many local nationals will provide logistical support and other services and some may attempt to gather intelligence for the enemy. OPSEC (Operation Security) must be

continuously trained and emphasized to preclude inadvertent disclosure of information that could aid the enemy.

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

Engineers will be involved in everything from base improvement projects to fighting as infantrymen. A key task for these engineers is constructing defensive positions that include digging trenches, building bunkers, emplacing obstacles as well as making mobile barricades. To be effective, engineers must be trained on mobility operations that emphasize street and road clearance of mines or booby traps, bridge classification and potential minefield breaching operations. Training on the foreign mines and shells that the enemy possess is mandatory. Engineers must also be well trained on the use of indigenous civilian engineer equipment since that may be used when U.S. equipment is not available. Finally, they must possess a high degree of demolitions training to support MOUT operations. This should include the incorporation of the CEV (Combat Engineer Vehicle) into training plans.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Sister services and all host nation forces must train together to improve operational command and control. This training must include exchanging operational terms and graphics, radio-telephone procedure, tactical doctrine, SOP, and procedures for calling and adjusting indirect and Air Force fire support. Furthermore, all forces involved in the theater must train

together in MOUT. Fire control measures for direct and indirect fire weapons, coordination between adjacent units, route coordination, and night operations are only a few areas that need joint/combined training for MOUT.

Additional training will be required in the ROE (Rules Of Engagement). These are "directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States Forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagements with other forces encountered."¹⁴ The ROE will be more restrictive than those for a conventional war zone. Effectiveness will require extremely well-disciplined and knowledgeable soldiers who will act appropriately in the absence of leaders in the chain of command.

Likewise, supplemental training and emphasis is needed in the law of warfare. In low intensity combat, the enemy is not always clearly definable and therefore frustrations often run high. This training is absolutely necessary to preclude damaging your position with the local populace. Leadership training on ethics, character, integrity, and values is necessary to produce the right command climate where young soldiers potentially separated over great distances will be disciplined and always do the "right thing." Understanding the capabilities and limitations of CA (civil affairs) and PSYOPS (psychological operations) is essential and should be planned early and integrated throughout all operations. Whoever wins the hearts of

the people will eventually win the conflict and these are both excellent ways of promoting support for the local government and countering the effects of any propaganda campaign directed against host nation forces or U.S. Forces. In addition, tactical force protection training will take on increased importance because of the possibility of terrorist attacks. This training should consist of both active and passive measures designed to deter and defeat threats directed towards deployed individuals, units, field sites, and equipment.

Training in anti-terrorism actions, search techniques, sentry duties, physical security planning for installation, and alert procedures is needed. Effective LNOs (liaison officers) will be essential when dealing with light and SOF forces, sister services, and the host nation. These soldiers must be well-versed in their own capabilities and limitations, SOPs, and command and control procedures. Additionally, they must be knowledgeable and mature enough to act on their unit's behalf. Lastly, language training to communicate in your host nation is imperative. This training ranges from commanders who need it to coordinate an engagement to LNOs who will coordinate all activities to the rifleman who needs a basic "survival" understanding of the language.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

Do a good air IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) immediately and task organize assets to meet the

threat. An important product of this process is the clear identification of the aircraft that the host nation as well as the enemy possess. This information is needed to train all members of the task force in IFF (identify friend or foe) procedures. An additional training suggestion is to understand joint/combined air early warning nets and to effectively integrate into it early in the deployment. This can only be accomplished through training on what the nets are and how they operate.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Logistical support forces for low intensity combat may very well precede combat units in their deployment to a theater; therefore, individual and collective protection is necessary from the very beginning. Weapons proficiency, patrolling, and the proper use of appropriate security equipment, i.e., night vision devices, trip flares, and .50 caliber machine guns on ring mounts need to be part of routine training. Because of a potentially poor ground transportation network which might run through enemy territory, air resupply will take on increased importance. Units need to be adept at rigging and other necessary procedures for both airdrop and airmobile resupply.

Battle tasks must include armed convoy operations and perimeter defense. Units must train on how to establish their own ASP (ammunition supply point). This should include the physical layout, security requirements, accountability

procedures, and MHE (material handling equipment) requirements. As mentioned previously, heavy units must train with light units to understand what the logistical requirements are for both and how these requirements are met. The austere logistical tail in light units presents numerous challenges especially when cross attached with heavy forces.

In the maintenance area more training needs to be done in diagnostic skills and leader maintenance training. Units may well be separated by great distances and organizational and direct support maintenance teams will be working well forward without the benefit of senior officer/NCO expertise. There is also a need for people to be trained on the manual requisition process since the interfacing computers may not be in place. Furthermore, mechanics need to be cross-trained on various vehicles and pieces of equipment. Because of a potential bare base logistical system, units must also consider the need to receive additional training on contingency contracting and host nation support agreements. This training should include all sources of in-country supply.

Combat lifesaver training is a must. The 40-hour program of instruction will provide great dividends in any theater at any level of war. This training should be coupled with extensive aerial medevac operations which are well thought through, rehearsed, and integrated into all tactical exercises.

RECOMMENDATIONS

All of the previous training suggestions can be accomplished at unit level by incorporating them into the unit's training strategy and plans. Additionally, there are several things the U.S. Army can change in its training system that will better prepare heavy units for low intensity combat. These changes will now be discussed in three groups: unit training, institutional training, and training support.

Unit training is both individual and collective training usually done at home station. There are several things the Army can do to improve unit training. Operation JUST CAUSE and current heavy/light NTC (National Training Center) rotations still indicate that while we are improving in heavy/light/SOF operations there is still work to be done. Base realignment where heavy and light units could be colocated would improve interoperability through maximizing training opportunities. These bases should also be located, where possible, closer to SPOEs (sea ports of embarkation) and APOEs (aerial ports of embarkation) thereby increasing the ease of deployment training.

The Army needs to continue to link units with certain contingency areas, thereby giving units the chance to develop earlier their METL and battle tasks, and where possible train in these areas. Because of the eventual downsizing of the Active Component and therefore the requirement to commit Reserve/National Guard units to both reinforcing and contingency

missions, the people, equipment, and training readiness of these units will be of the utmost importance. They must be trained for low intensity combat, with special emphasis on incorporating PSYOPS and Civil Affairs reserve units into active duty training plans. Our ability to train with our sister services in a low intensity environment needs to improve. Currently, there are few joint exercises involving heavy forces in a LIC environment. Small CPXs with all services participating would solve this problem.

Institutional training is collective and individual training conducted at training bases and proponent schools and usually has instructors/observer controllers that are external to the unit. For the purposes of this study this includes NTC, JRTC (Joint Readiness Training Center), CMTC (Combat Maneuver Training Center) and BCTP (Battle Command Training Program). There is minimal emphasis on low intensity combat in our educational system from the Army War College level down to the service schools. School curriculums need to refocus so as to place more emphasis on low intensity combat to include not only instruction but also practical exercises involving heavy, light, SOF, joint, and allied forces in a low intensity environment. The NTC had its first contingency operations exercise involving heavy, light and SOF during rotation 90-8 in August 1990. Additionally, up to ten heavy/light rotations a year with two contingency operations rotation have been planned. Every JRTC rotation includes contingency operations with the goal being up to twelve

light/heavy/SOF rotations a year. While all this indicates we are moving in the right direction, we still need to involve SOF in all exercises, increase the number of contingency operations rotations at the NTC and insure there is not a backslide to a preponderance of all heavy rotations at the NTC because of the Iraqi War. The CMTC also needs to look at heavy/light/SOF contingency operations considering EUCOM's area of responsibility includes most of Africa. The old idea of European forces only fighting in Central Europe is no longer valid as seen in the recent deployment of VII Corps to Saudi Arabia.

Currently all heavy divisions/corps use a conventional war scenario for BCTP. While it is not envisioned to totally convert these scenarios to low intensity combat, some effort needs to be made to incorporate the low intensity combat environment into at least a portion of this training. Heavy units need to take more advantage of existing LIC-related courses. The tendency in the past has been to think that heavy units would not be involved in this environment, so why worry? For information on what is available, the Center for Low Intensity Conflict produced a compendium of LIC courses entitled "Low Intensity Conflict Education and Training Within DOC." Additionally, TRADOC currently conducts nine specialized force protection courses that should be investigated for potential use.

Training support encompasses all the tools needed to conduct training such as field manuals and training circulars,

facilities, training aids and devices, and simulations. An area that needs improvement is MOUT training which is a weakness throughout the Army. Currently in CONUS there is one post with a standard company (32 building) and platoon (16 building) MOUT facility, one post with a standard company MOUT facility and three posts with standard platoon MOUT facilities. In Europe, only Hohenfels has a standard company MOUT facility. The Army needs to push the construction of the standard company and platoon facilities so all divisions will be able to train on this task. This training must also emphasize using heavy and light forces to support each other in MOUT. Additionally, the Infantry School is looking into how to fight in cities while keeping collateral damage to a minimum. This effort needs to continue since low intensity combat will be characterized by restrictive firepower.

There is only one good low intensity combat simulation which is called Panther, and it is seldom used by heavy forces. The TRADOC CATS (Combined Arms Training Strategy) recommends that a STAFFEX be conducted at division and corps level and a CPX from battalion to corps levels annually. This training strategy should be adopted by all heavy units and then implemented. Additional LIC simulations should also be developed to provide some variety. The more heavy and light forces train together, the more we identify problems in their interoperability. We need to continue to work on the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to maximize the strengths of these forces working together

and incorporate this in the 71 series manuals. As an offshoot to the previous thought, the Army needs to carefully look at how we optimize the heavy/light/SOF mix in the low intensity environment in AirLand Battle future doctrine.

Lastly, with future Army budgets shrinking, we must continue to train smartly on this new LIC focus. Although there will be some start-up costs, we need to maximize the use of video teleconferencing, computer-based instruction, and interactive video discs to train both the AC and the RC. This has to be an integral part of all training strategies and will save money by reducing TDY costs.

CONCLUSION

As long as there is discontent, poverty, violence and instability in the world, there will be low intensity conflict. Admiral Crowe, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, once remarked: "...I know very few instances of low intensity conflict where you're actually fighting that are not going to involve conventional forces of some kind of another."¹⁵ Heavy forces are a vital part of this total force package critical to the support of our nation's political objectives. These forces must be highly trained, logistically supported, and easily deployable for these most important military operations. Although heavy units must not lose sight of how important their training is for the conventional battlefield, they must adopt a balanced training program for all eventualities. In most cases,

heavy forces need to refocus their training efforts to be ready for the next possible war - low intensity combat. The suggestions for unit training and the recommendations for Army systemic improvements made in this paper will better prepare the Army for these future challenges.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20, p. 1-1 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-20").
2. Caesar D. Sereseres, "Lessons From Central America's Revolutionary Wars, 1972-1984," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Vol. I, ed. by Robert E. Harkay and Stephanie G. Neuman, p. 161.
3. General James J. Lindsay, USA, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Risks Increase," Defense, May/June, p. 31.
4. "Strategy for Low Intensity Conflict," in U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, Course II, Vol. 2, p. 286.
5. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-07 (Test), p. III-9 (Hereafter referred to as "Joint Pub 3-07").
6. Ibid., p. GS-12.
7. Ibid., pp. GL-9 and GL-7.
8. FM 100-20, p. 2-40.
9. JCS Pub 3-07, p. GL-7.
10. William J. Olson, "Organizational Requirements for LIC," Military Review, January 1988, p. 15.
11. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Long Range Training Plan 1989-2018, p. 8.
12. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-100, p. 117 (Hereafter referred to as "FM 25-100").
13. Ibid., p. 2-4.
14. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, p. 317 (Hereafter referred to as "Joint Pub 1-02").
15. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. "A War is a War is a War," in U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, Course II Vol. 2, p. 282.

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- U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington: 1 December 1989.